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3Summary
Transparency in nuclear arms is an important measure for world security, strengthening the
nuclear nonproliferation regime and preparing the ground for nuclear disarmament. In fact,
significantly enhanced information about the nuclear weapon complexes and stockpiles in
the nuclear weapon states - whether de jure or de facto - is an indispensable condition for
far-reaching nuclear arms reductions and the final jump to a world without nuclear
weapons.
There are several efforts underway that seek to enhance transparency in the nuclear sectors
- civilian and military - of the nuclear weapon states. There is the bilateral START process
between the US and Russia, and in its wake the trilateral initiative exploring the possibility
of verifying material from dismantled warheads, in which the International Atomic Energy
Agency is participating. There is the International Plutonium Regime recently agreed among
eight Plutonium users. There is the new protocol to the NPT verification system; some of its
measures are intended to be applied universally, including the nuclear weapon states. And
there is the prospect, which is at present unfortunately rather distant, of a cut-off of the
production of fissile material for explosive purposes, the verification of which will also
cover part of the nuclear weapon complexes.
Nevertheless, there is no general agreed and comprehensive approach to transparency. This
study proposes a register for nuclear weapons and fissile material not under international
safeguards, in which the five de jure and the three de facto nuclear weapon states could
participate. The register would be installed in three stages. In the first phase, fairly general
and unspecified information would suffice. In the second stage, information would be
broken down into details of weapons and material holdings. In the third stage, precise data
as to location and parameters would be provided. During the first two stages, different
obligations would apply to de jure (United States, Russia, United Kingdom, France, China)
and de facto  (Israel, India, Pakistan) nuclear weapon states, in order to keep the legal
distinction embedded in the NPT valid.
Verification would probably not start until well into the second stage, again to facilitate
acceptance by all relevant players. In its later stages, the register would probably be linked
to verification measures connected with other arms control and arms reduction instruments
(e.g. a cut-off or a START IV agreement). Verification might be the responsibility of
bilateral, P-5 multilateral, and completely international bodies.
The register concept is compatible with three conceivable scenarios for future nuclear world
order, and would help to bolster peace in each of them. In a great power concert, it would
enhance mutual confidence and help prevent the reemergence of a nuclear arms race. In a
trusteeship model where the nuclear weapon states would be mandated to take particular
responsibility for world security, it would underline their accountability towards the
community of states. In a model of international politics moving towards nuclear
disarmament it would provide the basis on which the most decisive steps would rest: there
might be more transparency without complete disarmament, but there will certainly not be
disarmament without complete transparency.
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1. Introduction
A nuclear weapons register has been proposed in different contexts and with different
purposes in mind. In the view of the author, the register is a multiobjective transparency
measure of great utility that would contribute considerably to international security, to more
equitable relations among states with different nuclear statuses, and, would be a highly
useful, and perhaps even indispensable, precondition of future progress in nuclear
disarmament.
The time for a fresh approach to this idea may now have come. The United Kingdom is
pursuing its Strategic Defence Review and is reported to be considering the register concept
in that context. The nuclear weapon states are reflecting about ways to discuss with the
non-nuclear weapon states disarmament issues, either in the CD or in the enhanced Review
Process of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Transparency measures may be a promising
start to such a new dialogue.
This study1 discusses the origins of the idea and the interests of the parties that have put it
forward on various occasions. It then explains the five purposes a nuclear arms register
would serve: reduced of discrimination; accountability; security; and disarmament. The third
part discusses the possible scope of the register, and how its scope could be expanded in
later stages. The tricky issue of how to include the de facto nuclear weapon states is also
tackled. Next, the utility and modalities of verification of a register are scrutinized; in this
connection, light is shed on the relation of the register to other disarmament measures such
as a cut-off, nuclear arms reduction treaties between two or more of the nuclear weapon
states, and an international plutonium regime. Before drawing some final conclusions, I
investigate in which institutional context the nuclear arms register idea might best be
pursued.
The author is not neutral as to the register idea. I am convinced that this concept holds
considerable promise and is a useful addition to world security, even if it starts as a rather
modest and limited system.
2. Where Did the „Register Idea“ Come From?
On December 16, 1993, German Foreign Minster Klaus Kinkel pronounced a major
„nonproliferation initiative“.2 This was a significant move since his predecessor, the
                                         
1 The considerations in this paper build on two previous studies: Harald Müller, Transparency in
Nuclear Arms: Toward a Nuclear Weapons Register, in: Arms Control Today, Vol. 24, No. 8, October
1994, pp. 3-7; and Harald Müller/Katja Frank, A Nuclear Weapons Register: Concepts, Issues and
Opportunities, in: Malcolm Chalmers, Mitsuro Donowaki, Owen Greene (eds.), Developing Arms
Transparency. The Future of the UN Register, Bradford (University of Bradford Arms Register Studies
No. 7), 1997, pp. 233-255.
2 Deutsche 10-Punkte-Erklärung zur Nichtverbreitungspolitik, Bonn (Auswärtiges Amt), 15. Dezember
1993, Point 8.
2formidable Hans-Dietrich Genscher, whom Kinkel had succeeded not long before, had taken
up this issue with his usual energy in the late eighties and had pursued it with great
determination. Kinkel’s action was therefore a serious attempt to prove his worth as
Genscher’s successor.
The initiative contained ten points, among them German support for the indefinite extension
of the NPT and for a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Point eight reads as follows:
“Establishment of a nuclear weapons register. In this way we will implement the
demand for transparency in respect of stockpiles of nuclear weapons. This
transparency is important with regard to international confidence-building in nuclear
disarmament by the nuclear weapon states: only when stocks are known can the
success of nuclear disarmament be measured. The idea of a nuclear weapons register
is the logical continuation of our initiative to implement a register for conventional
weapons in the UN context.” (Author's translation)
This proposal is a continuation of a long-standing and consistent German policy in the
nuclear sector.3 While Germany has always supported nuclear arms control and voiced - at
least rhetorically - its approval of complete nuclear disarmament, the country's activities and
genuine initiatives have been most significant in two particular fields: tactical nuclear
weapons in Europe and transparency and verification in the nuclear weapon states. Germany
has been a vocal promoter during past NPT Review Conferences of the expansion of IAEA
safeguards in the civilian nuclear sectors of Nuclear Weapon States (NWS); it has
stubbornly requested a verification regime for the fissile material coming out of nuclear
disarmament (the International plutonium Regime, another of Kinkel’s 10 points) and has
pursued the transparency issue energetically in the Vienna talks among nine countries which
have recently resulted in guidelines for civilian plutonium users; it has fought, to the dismay
of even some non-nuclear weapon states, for the „universality principle“ in the 93 plus 2
negotiations on improving IAEA safeguards for NPT parties, and succeeded in getting
included in the preamble of the resulting protocol the stipulation that 93 plus 2 measures
should be applied, as universally as possible - that is, in the nuclear weapon states as well. In
its negotiations with Russia about the supply of MOX technology for the disposal of
weapons plutonium, Germany has insisted that such material must come under IAEA
safeguards. In this policy, the German government has been guided by two interests: the
conviction that enhanced transparency in nuclear weapon states is an important contribution
to international security and the desire of a large non-nuclear weapon state with a strong
civilian nuclear industry to avoid suffering discrimination at the hands of the nuclear weapon
states and to afford them as few privileges as possible. (For the same reasons, Germany also
supported strongly the inclusion of an „erga omnes“ clause in the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group
guidelines, which force suppliers not to turn a blind eye to transfers to NWS but to
scrutinize such transfers to ensure that they do not give rise to a proliferation risk.)
                                         
3 Harald Müller/Wolfgang Kötter, Germany and the Bomb. Nuclear Policies in the Two German States
and the United Germany's Nonproliferation Commitments, Frankfurt (PRIF Reports No. 14), 1990;
Alexander Kelle/Harald Müller, Germany, in: Harald Müller (ed.), European Non-Proliferation Policy
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3Immediately after Kinkel’s speech, German diplomats in the capitals of allied nuclear
weapon states encountered some hostile responses. Part of the reason for this was a lack of
consultation beforehand. No one likes surprises in an area that is seen as closely relating to
the national interest. The opposition was also grounded in the deep-rooted NWS reluctance
to enter into any multilateral undertakings that endanger their complete freedom of action,
and their deep instinctive fear of compromising either their privileged position or their
national security by granting anything resembling transparency. This transparency-shy
attitude is no absolute, and it varies considerably among the nuclear powers - with the U.S.
under the courageous leadership of former Secretary of Energy Hazel O’Leary making the
greatest efforts to be accountable for the whereabouts of US fissile material both to the
international community and to the American people themselves.
Anyway, highly unfriendly reactions were reported to Bonn from Washington, D.C.,
London and Paris. The French reaction was so strong that the then German ambassador in
Paris threatened not to follow instructions in the future that would force him to take the
issue up again. As a consequence, the German government decided to bury the issue for the
time being.4 While the idea still enjoys support within the foreign ministry and other parts of
the German government, the issue has since not be seen as being of sufficiently high priority
to make it worthwhile risking the displeasure of Germany's three most important allies by
making a renewed attempt.
At about the same time, Argentina proposed a discussion of the establishment of a nuclear
arms register in the CD. As far as we understand the Argentinean approach, it would have
been more appropriately depicted as a proposal for a nuclear disarmament register. The
nuclear weapon states would register the nuclear weapons deactivated and dismantled as a
consequence of nuclear disarmament agreements. Over time, the expectation went, such
annual registrations would create enhanced transparency and thereby contribute to the
international climate in favour of disarmament. It can also be assumed that Argentina
wanted to see the CD becoming more involved in the nuclear disarmament process, thereby
improving the climate among nuclear and non-nuclear weapon states during the debate
about the extension of the NPT - a treaty that the country had acceded to only recently, and
that Buenos Aires turned out to be a staunch supporter of. The Argentinean initiative,
however, did not lead to any action on the issue.5
A third approach was made by Egypt during the deliberations of the group of experts tasked
with reviewing the experiences of the UN Register of Conventional Arms Transfers and
developing suggestions for improvements. This group considered, inter alia, changing the
parameters of arms to be reported, adding new types of weapons, including small arms, and
requesting additional data - beyond arms exports and imports - on holdings and domestic
production. Egypt, for its part, proposed adding weapons of mass destruction to the
register.
This would have changed the character of the register considerably. So far, it collects
information about transfers of conventional weapons, not about production or holdings. In
                                         
4 See Befehl verweigert, in: Der Spiegel, No. 15, 1994, p. 16.
5 Argentina Working Paper, Conference on Disarmament, Ad hoc Committee on Transparency, in:
Armaments (CD/TIA/WP.14), 3 August 1993.
4the nuclear field, however, transfers of weapons are illegal for all parties to the
nonproliferation treaty, including the five official nuclear weapon states.
The Egyptian motivation was and is most likely an attempt to exert additional pressure on
Israel. Israel, generally credited with a nuclear weapons arsenal of at least 50-100 warheads,
is the only country with this capability in the Middle East. While Egypt is at peace with
Israel, it is not willing to accept this difference of capabilities and has taken several
initiatives to force Israel to make concessions; Israel, however, while declaring in principle
its intention to eventually become non-nuclear, has declared the consolidation of peace,
including relations with the countries still hostile to its very existence, a precondition for
nuclear disarmament. On this basis, both the global (NPT) and the regional (Nuclear
Weapon Free Zone) strategies have met Israeli refusal. The negotiation track of the Arms
Control and Regional Security Working Group has run into stalemate over the Arab
reluctance to agree to confidence-building measures and conventional arms reductions as
long as Israel objects to even discussing the framework of a nuclear-weapon free zone;
Israel staunchly refuses to discuss any nuclear matters as long as the peace process has not
reached a much  more advanced stage. The nuclear weapons register, it thus appears, offers
Egypt an additional approach.6
Within the CD’s ad hoc group on Transparency in Arms (TIA), the non-aligned countries
have persisted in linking their readiness to talk about enhanced conventional arms
transparency with a fresh approach to creating transparency in weapons of mass
destruction. This ball has bounced back and forth several times between the UN
Conventional Weapons Transfer Register’s Group of Experts, the UN General Assembly,
and the CD’s TIA group. Since there was no positive response from the nuclear weapon
states, the TIA group could not register any progress in its work and, since 1994, has more
or less ceased to function.7
Thus the idea of a nuclear arms register has come from different quarters, been fed by
various motivations, and taken several distinct shapes. No progress has been made in terms
of preparing a legal instrument that would establish accountability of the nuclear weapon
states to the world community. However, in the meantime, some additional transparency
has been achieved by other means. Four nuclear weapon states, and certain other countries
possessing plutonium for civilian uses have adopted the practise of declaring annually their
holdings. The United States has publicized a considerable amount of data on its past
production and present holdings of plutonium and highly enriched uranium, for both civilian
and military uses. The planning data given by the three Western nuclear weapon states
about the future size of their nuclear arsenals make it possible to narrow down the range of
estimates as to their weapon holdings. This progress should be noted, but it falls short of
what we could expect from a nuclear arms register.
The range of interests that was behind the objections of the nuclear weapon states has not
disappeared. The „haves“ are concerned that revealing information might compromise their
                                         
6 Malcolm Chalmers/Owen Greene, The UN Register in its Fourth Year, Bradford (University of
Bradford Arms Register Studies, Working Paper 2), November 1996, pp. 31-32.
7 Sean Howard, Post-NPT Extension Confidence-Building Measures: Proposals for a Nuclear Weapons
Register, in: John Poole/Richard Guthrie (Eds.), Verification 1996: Arms Control, Peacekeeping and
Environment, Oxford (Westview Press), 1996, pp. 77-86.
5national security. A part of the secrecy syndrome is obviously exaggerated and meant as
symbol of the privileges that nuclear weapon are supposed to convey to their possessors.
But other aspects deserve more serious consideration. Particularly the smaller nuclear
weapon states may fear that revealing data about their nuclear weapon holdings may make
them more vulnerable. It might even be that some of them wish to avoid embarrassment
because their arsenals are smaller than the world presently believes, and they may fear that
their deterrent might be devalued of its true size were to be exposed. However, there are
now signs that the United Kingdom, under its new government, is about to change this
attitude. Its Defence Review might recommend that data about weapons plutonium and
uranium stockpiles be published and the Chapel Cross reactor complex, once used to
produce such weapons material, be put under international safeguards.8
The desire to keep things secret might also be a consideration for the de-facto-nuclear
weapon states. In addition, as will be elaborated further below, the world community,
including even the neighbours of these states, might share an interest in not drawing too
much attention to their nuclear weapon complexes. In any negotiation on a register, these
interests must be recognized and taken adequately into consideration.
3. Rationales for a Nuclear Arms Register
In the discussion of the origins of the German initiative, some of the rationales for
establishing such a register were touched upon. They will now be discussed in a more
systematic way.
3.1 The Meaning of Transparency
A register is, above all, a measure of transparency. It thus conforms to a time-honored and
frequently used type of arms control measure; there exist numerous examples of declaration,
verification and generalized measures such as the Open Sky Treaty, all of which serve to
enhance transparency in the military sectors of the participating states. Of course, the UN
Register on Conventional Arms already exists as a model of a „register“ in the military field,
though because of the vast difference in the nature of the weapons in question, a nuclear
weapons register is likely to present different challenges and requirements. Before looking
into the specific objectives involved in the attempt to establish a nuclear weapons register, it
is useful to recall the meaning of transparency as a key principle of a cooperative
international security policy.9
                                         
8 Severin Carrell , Trident Missile Fleet will be Slashed , Scotland on Sunday, 27 July 1997.
9 A useful discussion of the meaning of transparency is Ashton B. Carter et al., A New Concept of
Cooperative Security, Washington, D.C. (Brookings Institution), 1992.
6To achieve a maximum of transparency in the military posture of major powers is one of the
most important preconditions of the peaceful coexistence of nation states in the
international system. This postulate results from the central meaning of the security dilemma
in a world environment where no ultimate authority exists for adjudicating conflicts between
states. Modern history has driven governments to try to hedge against the possibility of an
attack by resorting to self-help, that is, building armed forces that could withstand a hostile
assault. As all states engage in this same practice, they create the very threat perception
which motivates their neighbors to continue arming. Their security then deteriorates as a
consequence of this multilateral arms race, with heightened risks of instability and,
eventually, war. If, however, states decide to renounce a strong defense for themselves, they
might find themselves in the dismal situation of Germany’s neighbors in 1939. Each
alternative, in other words, holds the prospect of opening a pandora's box full of disasters.10
Pundits of „Realpolitik“ take this situation to be an unchangeable state of nature. In reality,
however, states have been capable of transforming the security dilemma considerably. It has
virtually disappeared, for example, in Scandinavia, Western Europe and North America. In
these cases, states have successfully changed their practices of interaction and have built
security institutions with a view to reducing mutual distrust and uncertainty. It is thus
possible in principle to affect the security dilemma, if the political will exists. 11
Among major power contenders such as the nuclear weapon states, the security dilemma
can only be solved if states communicate to each other successfully that they have no
intention - and possibly not even the capability - to start a war of aggression. As surprise is
the condition for successful attack in most cases, unless there are vast asymmetries in
power, concealing one’s own posture is easily taken as indication that sinister intentions
could exist. In contrast, offering one’s neighbors unlimited insight into the parameters of
one’s own military strength and defense policies demonstrates that one has renounced the
prerequisite for a concealed build-up intended for aggressive purposes. The use of
transparency to address this problem should therefore involve making three particular
features more transparent: intentions, capabilities, and decision-making processes.12
This consideration is particularly significant in the nuclear sector. The fear of a crippling
first-strike attack informed much of the strategic debate during the US-Soviet rivalry and
was a factor which drove the strategic arms race and fuelled the mutual suspicions of the
superpowers. Of particular concern was the intrinsic secrecy of the Soviet system, a secrecy
that was at its strictest in the highly sensitive nuclear military sector. One remembers the
famous request by the USSR's military participants in the SALT negotiations to their U.S.
counterparts not to reveal data about the size and structure of Soviet strategic forces to
Moscow’s civilian negotiators. Also, a number of strategic thinkers maintained that
„uncertainty“ about one’s doctrine and posture added to deterrence; this philosophy had
                                         
10 Robert Jervis, Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma, in: World Politics, Vol. 30, No. 2, January
1978, pp 167-214, here pp. 30-2; Charles L. Glaser, The Security Dilemma Revisited, in: World
Politics, Vol. 50, No. 1, October 1997, pp. 171-201.
11 Alexander Wendt, Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics, in:
International Organization, Vol. 46, Spring 1992, pp. 391-425.
12 William Walker, Reflections on Nuclear Transparency and Irreversibility: The Re-regulation of
Partially Disarmed States, Background Paper for Session Five of the Conference on the Fissile
Material Cutoff, Schlangenbad, June 1997, p. 4.
7many adherents in France.13 Today, after the START agreements and bilateral US-Russian
transparency measures have shed more light on these countries' nuclear complexes, the total
opacity of the Chinese strategic posture and of Beijing’s future plans could become a major
cause of US and Russian „hedging“ policy and thus a serious obstacle to radical cuts in
nuclear arms. As China is certain to become a more and more important player in Asia and
on the world scene, this could well result in the resumption of the arms race if no
countermeasures are taken. Transparency is very clearly an effective instrument in
preventing the deterioration of what is at present a relatively benign constellation.
Transparency in nuclear arms and materials, therefore, not only provides others with clarity
about one’s own capabilities and so eliminates the basis for „worst case analysis“ by the
strategic planners of the other side, it also permits a conclusion by others as to one’s
peaceful intentions: a state with a completely transparent military structure is utterly
unlikely to have embarked on a policy of aggression and conquest.
3.2 Security of the Nuclear Weapon States
While some may think that a nuclear arms register might not be in the interests of the
nuclear weapon states, the contrary is true. These countries face very few threats at present.
One very distinct risk, however, is that they might become involved with each other in an
inadvertent escalation. This risk was very much in the minds of leaders during the Cold
War, although it has receded recently as a consequence of political change. There is no
guarantee, however, that it might not reemerge again if and when the relationship between
two or more of these states - de facto nuclear weapon states included - were to deteriorate.
As long as the security dilemma, as discussed above, persists, this danger will continue to
exist. To a considerable degree, it is fuelled by the uncertainties and opacities of the nuclear
sectors. These force military planners and their political masters to maintain material and
weapon reserves, plans and options for a wide variety of contingencies that could be
reduced if more reliable information were available. In turn, the availability of such
capabilities in the other countries enhances security concerns and helps to sustain
unnecessary levels of distrust that only worsen the security dilemma. Opacity in nuclear
holdings, therefore, remains an important basis of mutual suspicious that could, under
changed circumstances, lead to a renewed emergence of crisis. The enhancement of
transparency, in turn, would solidify the relatively smooth relations presently achieved and
thus serve directly the security of all nuclear weapon states.
3.3 Reducing Discrimination
An obvious, albeit not the main objective of a register is to reduce the discrimination
embedded in the distinction between nuclear and non-nuclear weapon states as defined by
the NPT. Misgivings about this discrimination are shared by non-aligned and industrialized
non-nuclear weapon states, though not necessarily with the same degree of intensity.
                                         
13 Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, 2. ed., Basingstoke (Macmillan), 1989.
8Industrialized non-nuclear weapon states with sizable nuclear industries such as Germany,
Japan, Belgium, Switzerland and Spain have been most sensitive to this problem. Their
insistence that recently negotiated improvements in the IAEA system of safeguards - the
„93 plus 2“ program - be applied universally, a request pursued with particular fineness by
Germany, was a clear indication how strongly they feel about this aspect of inequality.
This matter could be viewed as of marginal relevance. Do the misgivings of second-rate
powers, or even less important countries, really count? It would be a serious mistake - not
too uncommon in nuclear weapon states' capitals - to underestimate the erosive capacity of
bad feelings caused by the discrimination problem. It is unlikely that countries would leave
the NPT for this reason alone; but the coherence of the regime rests on the voluntary
adherence of a large number of countries and on the degree of support they are willing to
lend to the Treaty when it is under siege, for example during a controversy over compliance
issues. The more the meaning of a Treaty is disputed, the harder it will be to rally full and
unswerving support in order to defend it, with all means if necessary, if and when a breach
of the rules has taken place. It is for the sake of enhancing coherence and consensus for
compliance crises that the reduction of discrimination is both useful and important.
NNWS are totally transparent as to their holdings of military fissile material - namely zero -
and civilian fissile material. The latter is scrupulously accounted for by these countries and
their operators and registered and verified by the IAEA and these respective regional
organizations. None of the nuclear weapon states is subject to such transparency with the
exception of Britain and France, where civilian fissile material is under EURATOM (but not
IAEA) safeguards. The voluntary safeguards agreements concluded by the NWS and the
IAEA do not really yield much, as they have led only to sporadic inspections at single sites.
While the U.S. and the U.K. have offered almost all their civilian nuclear factories for
possible IAEA inspection, the Agency has selected only a few, mainly for cost reasons.
Since the nuclear weapon states are among the most cost-conscious members of the
Agency, their budgetary conservatism contributes to blocking even the transparency that
could be achieved on the basis of existing legal instruments. No systematic register of fissile
material can be constructed in this way. And, of course, the military sector remains
completely opaque.14
Much of this is unnecessary and by no means justified by any security or nonproliferation
gains. There is no good reason why the world should not know how much fissile material -
civilian and non-civilian - is in the hands of the NWS, nor do there appear to be any threats
that could arise from openness about the total number of nuclear warheads owned by the
Five. The surprising gain in transparency represented by the voluntary accounts given by the
U.S. Department of Energy under Hazel O’Leary’s leadership is telling in this respect. In
other words, the present level of opaqueness appears to be kept as an unjustified privilege
rather then emerging, by necessity, from the distinction between nuclear and non-nuclear
weapon states. It is a privilege rather like those formerly derived from noble birth, and since
                                         
14 The authoritative study on what we know about fissile material in nuclear weapons and threshold
states is David Albright/Frans Berkhout/William Walker, Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium,
1996 World Inventories, Capabilities and Policies, Oxford (Oxford University Press), 1997, a true
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9it detracts from cohesion within the NPT community, should be abolished. A nuclear arms
register would make a reasonable contribution to progress in this area.
3.4 Accountability
A nuclear arms register would establish an important principle: that of accountability of the
nuclear weapon states to the international community. In a world where war as a means of
achieving legitimate objectives of policy is prohibited, accounting for one’s own defense
efforts so as to prove that they are compatible with purely peaceful and defensive purposes
should be a general principle of defense policy. In the OSCE area, this principle has been
established in the far-reaching exchange of information about armed forces, budgets,
procurement plans, military activities, and doctrine that takes place on a regular, annual
basis. Given the global reach of nuclear weapons, their possessors should be made
accountable in the same way.
The present situation is highly contradictory. On the one hand, the Five have requested -
and obtained - a temporary recognition of their status by way of the NPT. Since these five
countries are also the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, (However, it
should not be forgotten that these states' UN status is due to the fact that they were the
victorious powers of the Second World War, and not to their nuclear weapons; these did
not exist at the time when the UN Charter was written.), they bear a particularly grave
responsibility for world peace and security. And these states (or some of them) have
themselves repeatedly stated that, in contrast to the purported „rogue states“, they handle
these awful weapons with the appropriate responsibility.15 Yet when the world community
puts forward requests for a higher degree of transparency as a proof of this responsibility,
the nuclear weapon states tend to respond by saying „this is our national business“. This
contradiction is a shortcoming of the international security order not least because what has
become known about the treatment of ecological safety, human health, and the accountancy
and physical security of the nuclear weapons complexes in several of the nuclear weapon
states inspires very little confidence that the standard of „responsibility“ is as high as we
might wish. It is thus time to accept the principle of accountability; what is more, this
appears to be in the enlightened self-interest of the nuclear weapon states themselves. A
nuclear arms register is an instrument which would enable the NWS to prove their
accountability in a very important way. Other instruments are binding negative security
assurances, more explicit positive security assurances, and regular explanation of nuclear
doctrine and strategy; these instruments, however, are not dealt with in this paper.
3.5 Physical Security
As has already been mentioned, accountancy and physical security are not assured by any
law of nature in the NWS. Both democracies and non-democracies have found over many
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years that bureaucracies and organizations working outside the realm of public scrutiny - be
they military or civilian, public sector or private - tend to lose quality, establish sloppy and
at times dangerous practices, and perform suboptimally. There is thus no a priori reason to
believe that granting complete secrecy to the nuclear weapon complexes will result in
optimum physical security of nuclear weapons and related materials. The present state of
affairs in the former Soviet Union, above all in Russia, illustrates this problem. A register is
not only a transparency measure directed toward the outside world, though it is important in
this capacity; it is also an instrument forcing the nuclear weapon states and their diverse, at
times competing, bureaucracies to get their act together and to establish and/or maintain a
working and regular system of accounting and control for warheads and materials. It might
even be useful, in the context of a register, to establish a process of peer review among the
five concerning accountancy in their nuclear complexes. This may even help central bodies
to impose their authority on reticent bureaucracies at the functional, regional or local level.
3.6 Paving the Way for Nuclear Disarmament
A register is related to disarmament. Unfortunately, the connection between transparency
and disarmament is none too well understood by the most ardent supporters of a nuclear
weapon free world, as is demonstrated, inter alia, by the curious indifference of some non-
aligned countries towards a cut-off. In their zeal to achieve complete nuclear disarmament
in a single, or at most a few, steps, disarmers tend to overlook the fact that since nuclear
weapons are so well established in the security policies of the nuclear weapon states and
their allies, they will only be abolished if conditions can be created under which those
countries feel secure even in the absence of such weapons. There is a concern that a present
nuclear weapon state (de jure or de facto) could cheat on its undertakings and hide, or
quickly reconstitute, a part of its arsenal, thereby creating a nuclear monopoly with grave
consequences for the balance of world power and world security.16 This fear derives, to a
very large degree, from the present lack of transparency that surrounds the nuclear weapon
complexes. Only if opaqueness is overcome and full transparency established and
demonstrated through a series of nuclear arms control/arms reduction/confidence building
steps will a large enough majority in those countries support going to zero. Eventually,
nuclear weapon states will have to establish a convincing inventory of both their warheads
and their fissile materials, with historical records as complete as possible, as a prerequisite
of nuclear disarmament. The South African case proves that this is both necessary and
difficult to achieve.17 In this context, a register is a very useful step as it begins to establish
baselines against which disarmament progress can be measured. A register provides
signposts of transparency that can be expanded, through amendments of the register as well
as through complementary measures, until all countries are sufficiently confident that they
understand the (hopefully shrinking) size and composition of the other nuclear weapon
                                         
16 For an analysis of this scenario, see Alexander Kelle, Security in a Nuclear Weapons Free World. How
to Cope with the Weapons of Mass Destruction Threat, Frankfurt (PRIF Reports No. 50), 1998.
17 William Walker, Reflections on Nuclear Transparency and Irreversibility: The Re-Regulation of
Partially Disarmed States, Background Paper for Session Five of the Conference on the Fissile
Material Cutoff, Schlangenbad, June 1997, pp. 13-14.
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states’ posture and the related fabrication and storage complexes. (A cut-off would add
considerably to that transparency, and this in my view would be the most important
contribution of a cut-off.)18 Also, a register might make cost estimates of nuclear
disarmament easier and thus make it easier to prepare for the challenges the disarmament
process will pose. Seen from this perspective, a nuclear arms register is certainly a
necessary, though by no means a sufficient, condition of nuclear disarmament.
There are different views about the relative importance of these rationales. For the nuclear
weapon states, security is by far the strongest argument for following the register idea, since
other security aspects - secrecy - must be sacrificed in the process. For the non-aligned non-
nuclear weapon states, nuclear disarmament is probably the most important consideration,
while the industrialized ones may place greater emphasis on non-discrimination. Both would
accept that accountability is an important principle. Nuclear and non-nuclear weapon states
alike would probably accept the principle of transparency as important.
                                         
18 Harald Müller, Doomed Prospects? On a Ban for the Production of Fissile Materials for Weapons
Purposes, Southampton (PPNN Issue Brief), 1998.
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4. One-Shot Versus Step-by-Step Strategies Towards Nuclear
Disarmament
Promoting the concept of a nuclear weapons register as a step towards nuclear disarmament
means taking sides in a philosophical debate that rages between two different schools of
„nuclear disarmers“. On the one side, some suggest that one should prohibit nuclear
weapons just as the world community has prohibited biological weapons and is about to ban
chemical arms.19 On the other side, there are those who are convinced that nuclear
disarmament has a real chance only as an incremental step-by-step process. In this paper the
second position is supported, for the following reasons. Nuclear weapons have become so
integrated into the military structures, security policies, and, most important of all,
processes of thinking about security in the world's most powerful states, and even in many
of their non-nuclear allies, that it is politically and socially virtually impossible to remove the
nuclear factor from this security policy overnight. The reasons why people want to keep
nuclear weapons must be taken seriously and worked upon. Some of the functions ascribed
to nuclear weapons must be substituted by other means, members of the pro-nuclear
coalition must be won over by arguments and by changes in the security environment. This
process will take time. There are several factors which contribute to the current impasse:
1. A genuine sense that nuclear weapons have prevented war in the past and are essential
for providing national and/or international security in the future. This feeling is not confined
to the narrow circles of security experts, strategists, military personnel, and policy makers;
polls taken in nuclear weapon states (and threshold countries) usually show majorities for
the maintenance of national arsenals, though there is sometimes a readiness to get rid of
them if all nuclear states do the same. This important aspect is dealt with further below.
2. A belief that national status depends on the possession of nuclear weapons. In the light of
the experiences of the nuclear age, this notion is very questionable. The arsenals of the
nuclear weapon states have not given them more power in world politics. Bipolarity during
the Cold War rested largely on conventional resources of power - geography, population,
technological prowess, economic strength, organization, conventional armed forces and
power projection and, of course, the ideological antagonism. Nuclear weapons neutralized
each other; beyond this they had no effect. The Soviet Union was not able to survive a
change in the respective correlations of technology, economic strength, and conventional
armed forces, even though the superpowers' nuclear arsenals did not vary. And nuclear arms
have not helped Britain or France to enhance their status, prestige, or real influence; their
special positions have depended very much on their respective pasts as world powers and
on their roles in an integrating Europe.
The same applies to the proliferators. Israel's position is mainly dependent on its impressive
and repeatedly proven conventional superiority over its Arab neighbors. India's weight in
world politics has diminished rather than grown since 1974, when it tested a nuclear device.
Its recent resurgence has rested on domestic economic reforms and its regional power
projection capacity, not on its nuclear capabilities. Pakistan has gained nothing at all by its
                                         
19 Jürgen Scheffran, Nuclear Weapons Convention Drafting Makes Progress, in: INESAP Information
Bulletin 9, May 1996, pp. 37-38.
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nuclear activities, and has been marginalized since the end of the Soviet presence in
Afghanistan. The fate of the South African apartheid regime demonstrated most clearly the
irrelevance of nuclear weapons to international influence and the protection of a state's core
values.
Conversely, the two countries that have gained most in terms of international status and
influence over the last few decades, Japan and Germany, are not able for having renounced
weapons of mass destruction and concentrated on developing economic and environmental
skills. Also, the international position of South Africa, Argentina and Brazil improved
markedly after they adopted unequivocally non-nuclear policies.
Even though the erroneous belief that nuclear weapons may enhance a country's status is
still held in both nuclear and non-nuclear states, it can be expected that the belief itself will
decline. Adding non-nuclear weapon states as permanent members of the UN Security
Council will accelerate this process, as will the economic success of major developing
countries.
3. The vested interests of the nuclear weapon complexes, where thousands of jobs and
careers depend on the production, or at least the maintenance, of those horrifying arms. In
democratic systems, local constituencies and their representatives add to the
intrabureaucratic lobbying power of these complexes. One should bear in mind that this
vested interest is normal for every industrial, scientific and bureaucratic formation. We
should not be surprised or offended to find it in this sector as well. The solution is to devise
alternative perspectives for the people and organizations concerned; this fact has been
recognized by the nuclear weapon complex in the former Soviet Union, where the
international science and technology centres in Moscow and Kiev are devoted to providing
decent occupations for highly qualified personnel. While the specific objective is here to
prevent nuclear weapons experts from taking their skills to dangerous places, one should
realize that in the case of nuclear disarmament, an incremental program of this kind is
needed for all nuclear weapon and threshold countries if the social resistance to the project
is ever to be overcome.
The point here is not to state that, for these reasons, complete nuclear disarmament is
impossible. Rather, it should be emphasized that it faces serious and formidable obstacles
that must be overcome. Given that nuclear arms are embedded in structures of established
politico-strategic thinking and in social complexes with vested interests, it is clear that a
purely legal approach to the problem is unlikely to succeed. The suggestion that national
delegations should just sit down and negotiate a nuclear weapons convention that will do
away with the arsenals is utterly naive in the light of the obvious resistance existing in
precisely those political units that will be required to make the biggest changes. Sometimes
one even gets the feeling that grandiose demands for immediate or short-term complete
nuclear disarmament serve to conceal as genuine a dislike for the whole idea as the outright
refusal of the most dedicated pro-nuclear arms pundits. At least the consequences are not
too dissimilar.
What can one conclude from the discussion so far? Nuclear disarmament will not occur in a
single step, and not in a short and predictable time-frame, but as a result of an extended
learning process; the conditions of a non-nuclear world must be built one by one during this
process, so that fewer and fewer people will see the possession, or existence, of nuclear
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weapons as an existential necessity. Increasing transparency as the disarmament process
advances will enhance the probability that an increasing number of officials within the
nuclear weapon complex will be prepared to take the next step. It is this consideration that
has informed the arguments below for staging the register rather than installing it in one
single stroke.
5. Reasons to Take a Fresh Look at the Register Idea
As described above, the reaction to the original German proposal for a nuclear weapons
register was emphatically negative and Germany has decided not to pursue the matter any
further, though many German diplomats remain convinced that it was a useful concept.
However, several developments since this episode justify taking a fresh look at it. The
political climate in some of the nuclear weapon states has changed in a direction that may
make them more receptive today to the register approach than they were in 1993.
The US has taken admirable steps towards greater transparency in recent years. Most
remarkable was the publication of data about past production and actual holdings of
plutonium and highly enriched uranium, broken down into civilian use, exports, scrap,
stocks determined to be excessive for military requirements, and military stocks. This
information goes a very long way towards what would be needed for the first stage of the
register. In addition, much is known about deployed and reserve warhead numbers in the
US, though not with complete precision. In sum, the US is by far the most transparent
nuclear weapon state and has made conscious efforts in recent years to give its own public
and the wider world some idea about its material stockpile.
The U.S. is also the driving force in relations with Russia to achieve some bilateral
breakthrough, possibly aided by the IAEA, to greater transparency. The key process is a
series of  talks between Russia and the U.S. on Safeguards, Transparency and Irreversibility
(STI) of the nuclear disarmament process, pursuant to a framework agreement between
Vice President Gore and Prime Minister Chernomyrdin in spring 1994. The scope of this
effort includes mutual inspections of either side’s stocks of fissile material from dismantled
warheads, the exchange of information on warhead and fissile material stockpiles, and
cooperative measures to monitor warheads scheduled for future dismantlement. Meanwhile,
a „Trilateral Initiative“ has included IAEA representatives to discuss the modalities for
verifying declared excess material, possibly including material to be stored in the US-
financed storage facility that is being built at the Mayak nuclear site which will contain
fissile material - most likely in „pit“ form - from dismantled nuclear warheads.20 In M y
1995, both sides were close to a transparency agreement that would include an extremely
                                         
20 Department of Energy, Press Statement: Trilateral Initiative on Verifying Excess Weapon Origin
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Materials Released for Storage and Disposition. Paper presented at the International Policy Forum:
Management and Disposition of Nuclear Weapon Materials, Landsdowne, Virginia, February 12,
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detailed information exchange on warheads and fissile materials, including the „history“ of
production and semi-annual updates. The scheme under consideration would satisfy the
requirements of at least the stage 1, if not the stage 2 scope of the proposed nuclear arms
register as discussed below. The talks on these arrangements proceeded but then stagnated
in fall 1995, because of unexplained Russian concerns.21 But the fact that both sides were
willing even to consider the idea, and that the US was very eager to proceed - if only on a
bilateral basis - indicates a considerable change in attitude.
In their agreement on a framework for START III negotiations, agreed during the 1997
presidential summit in Helsinki, the United States and Russia noted that warheads should be
the unit of measurement for further nuclear arms reduction, that tactical nuclear weapons
should be on the agenda, and that further transparency should be achieved. Conspicuously,
the other three nuclear states were not called upon to participate in START III. The
wording of the agreement leads to the conclusion that the presidents envisaged going
beyond deployed warheads, and that future negotiations would look at the total ensemble of
nuclear warheads in US and Russian possession, reserves included. This would extend
bilateral transparency considerably beyond present limits. If START IV were then to
involve the other three, the START process could incorporate a considerable part of what a
register would be designed to achieve.
The defense review conducted by the new British government also promises to result in a
readiness to grant much more openness and transparency than the old government was
prepared to countenance. While the Major administration must be applauded for a quite
impressive reduction in the size of the British nuclear arsenal, it was one of the most
conservative forces in international nuclear disarmament. This appears to be about to
change. Reportedly, the new government not only envisages even deeper cuts, but is now
also prepared to publicize precise data about the holdings of weapons plutonium and
uranium, and is even considering opening up the Chapel Cross reactor complex, formerly
used for the production of fissile material for military purposes, to IAEA verification.22
There has also been an evolution in the French approach to disarmament which has been
going on for some time now, with the announcement of the „zero yield“ position during the
Test Ban negotiations in Geneva as the high point so far. France was the first of the five
nuclear weapon states to adopt this position. The new socialist government has not yet
shown any initiative in this field. Transparency measures, as one possible way of showing
goodwill in the nuclear disarmament field, are possibly the area where Jospin is least
vulnerable to conservative criticism and can still show that he is willing to go beyond the
limits set by his predecessor.
For the last three years a group of military and civilian plutonium users, including the five
nuclear weapon states, has been negotiating in Vienna on a plutonium management regime.
The talks have resulted in draft guidelines. They would oblige all participants to accept
safeguards on civilian plutonium (Pu) and Pu from former military use declared or
                                         
21 James Goodby, Casting a Wider Net: Nuclear Arms Negotiations beyond START II, in: Deep Cuts
Study Group (ed.), The Nuclear Turning Point. A Blueprint for Deep Cuts and Dealerting of Nuclear
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22 Scotland on Sunday, 27 July 1997.
16
designated as no longer required for military purposes. They would also commit themselves
to transparency measures, material accountancy, strict physical security and safety, and rules
on international transfers. The guidelines would thus cover a part of the presently
„unknown“ quantities in nuclear weapon states. Unfortunately, they contain a qualifying „as
soon as practical“ clause that may postpone the application of these measures ad infinitum
in some participating countries. It is also unclear whether China will really subscribe. But
again, the procedure shows a trend towards greater transparency. The participants have
been exploring the possibility of extending this or a similar regime to highly enriched
uranium.
The same conclusion can be derived from the 93 plus 2 negotiations, which ended in the
conclusion of a protocol to the present NPT verification system. Throughout the talks, a
number of states led by Germany argued for the universal application of these measures.
While a general  commitment could not be imposed upon the nuclear weapon states, they
are obliged to apply the measures to the fullest possible extent. It remains to be seen what
this will mean in practice. The U.S., for one, has already declared that it will adopt all
measures with the exception of those that would compromise national security and
nonproliferation.
Finally, the readiness of the nuclear weapon states to enter into negotiations on a fissile
material cut-off convention indicates an increased willingness to allow greater
transparency.23 A fissile material cut-off convention envisages a complete prohibition of any
new production of plutonium and highly enriched uranium for explosive purposes. As a
consequence, all such material circulating in civilian fuel cycles in the countries participating
- and one would hope that the P-5 and the threshold countries would sign and ratify such a
convention - would come under IAEA safeguards. While it is obvious that the nuclear
weapon states, in contrast to some of the „have-nots“, aim at a minimalist verification
system rather than the full-fledged adoption of INFCIRC/153  (the comprehensive NPT
safeguards system for non-nuclear weapon states), verifying a cut-off would still bring much
greater transparency to the nuclear weapons complexes. Also, the rules for uranium
submarine fuel, some of which is highly enriched, will be disputed. Another bone of
contention is the fate of existing stocks: a group of non-aligned non-nuclear weapon states,
plus Pakistan, have requested the inclusion of existing stocks in a cut-off regime, while the
nuclear weapon states, India and Israel are opposed. Some moderate transparency on
existing stocks, such as proposed in the stage 1 register model, could be a way out of the
present stalemate on this issue. This would, of course, enhance the transparency value of the
cut-off.
It therefore appears that a major reconsideration of traditional opaqueness is under way,
with the US in the lead and China the most reluctant party. Given the present stalemate in
the CD, for which the western NWS and Russia bear some responsibility, they may feel
compelled to show some goodwill in nuclear disarmament. The register concept might be
exactly the instrument for this purpose. It might thus be the right moment to give it a new
chance.
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6. Scope
The concept of a nuclear arms register sounds straightforward, but it is a very complex
issue. The discussion so far has made it clear that a register should cover both actual
warheads and weapons-usable fissile materials not presently under international safeguards;
there is also the issue of launchers. Starting from this comprehensive approach, a register
could be drawn up with increasing degrees of comprehensiveness in detail. It is possible to
conceive of a register that starts at a fairly general level, but becomes more detailed through
amendment over time, thus enhancing the degree of transparency as the disarmament train
moves forward.
6.1. The „De-Facto-Nuclear Weapon State Problem“
The most awkward issue is the way in which the de-facto nuclear weapon states are to be
included. This might prove, conceptually, the most difficult issue connected with the
register. The country presently pushing hardest for the whole concept, Egypt, is clearly
interested in exercising some sort of control over its nuclear armed neighbor. But not only is
it unlikely that Israel, India and Pakistan can be forced into the open on the numbers of
nuclear weapons they own; it may even be counterproductive to do so. For legally, they are
still counted as non-nuclear weapon states. There may be some merit in preserving this
status. First, as the South African and Ukrainian examples have proven, it might be easier to
adopt non-nuclear status if this does not imply a shift in legal status under international law
(neither was recognized as a nuclear weapon state). Also, domestic opposition might be less
stubborn in cases where the nuclear weapon status had never become official. Secondly,
making available data about the size of nuclear arsenals in these three countries might create
public pressures for proliferation in the respective regions. This would run contrary to the
process of nuclear disarmament and could finish this process for good.
On the other hand, it would be inconsistent to ignore these countries altogether; the
arguments for transparency in the nuclear weapon states, at least those relating to security
and disarmament, apply here as well. In addition, as the number of nuclear weapons is
reduced, the nuclear weapon states will be reluctant to disarm further while continuing to
provide data about their residual forces if other countries remain in a state of complete
opaqueness. Not including the de-facto nuclear weapon states would prove, again, a
stumbling block for nuclear disarmament. We should not forget that the nuclear weapon
states - supported by many non-nuclear weapon states - stated during the run-up to the
NPT Review and Extension Conference that there could be no disarmament without
nonproliferation. This relationship applies in our context as well.
Is there a way out of this dilemma? First, one should not be reluctant to establish
negotiation fora which can fully address the problems that the Three have in common with
the five nuclear weapon states; such negotiations might be kept informal, in order to prevent
any symbolic political damage to the NPT regime. During the CTBT negotiations, many
deals were done among the P-5, even though, officially and legally, the Ad-hoc Committee
and its working groups under the “friends of the chair” were the only fora for negotiation.
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Second, one should be careful to ensure that any results which become part of international
law do not accord a special status to the three. It will be very difficult to reconcile these two
imperatives, but the attempt has to be made. Third, we propose to have the Three
participating only in the part dealing with fissile materials, not in the warhead registry. The
register should thus be called „Register of nuclear arms and fissile materials not covered by
international safeguards“. This is neutral enough to avoid the pitfalls envisaged above, but,
if accepted, would still yield highly useful information. The register might then have a joint
preamble and statement of purpose (e.g., a contribution to nuclear disarmament etc.), but
two separate Annexes A and B relating to nuclear weapons and fissile materials,
respectively, with the Three only reporting to Annex B. Or one might prefer two completely
separate registers in order to avoid any linkage and merge them at the appropriate time. As
long as the desired degree of transparency is achieved, the precise way of organizing it is of
secondary importance and will be decided by weighing the political pros and cons.
6.2. Staging the Register
The nuclear weapon register should be capable of supporting an incremental process of
nuclear disarmament. Since it is meant to include as many of the eight de-jure and de-facto
nuclear weapons holders as possible, it would be unwise to devise a maximum transparency
register scheme from the beginning. Some of the eight are less accustomed to transparency
than others, and a very far reaching request for information might deter them from joining.
In accordance within the philosophy of incremental disarmament, therefore, it is proposed
to set up the register in three distinct stages.24
6.2.1 Stage I
One could imagine the register starting with the most general information in the two main
categories: number of warheads and total amount of Pu and highly enriched uranium
(including, where applicable, U 233) not under international safeguards. Thus for each
participant, the register would at this stage consist of three numbers, one in the warhead and
two in the fissile material category. While the second figure would include all such
materials, whether in warheads, in fabrication, refabrication or dismantlement processes, in
reserve or disposal storage, in scrap, in submarine fuel or even in the civilian fuel cycle but
not safeguarded by the IAEA, there would be no breakdown as to these subcategories. No
further information would be given at the outset. In fact, this information is less than that
available about U.S. warheads and fissile materials stockpiles at present and it is even less
than the U.S. envisioned when it proposed „stockpile transparency“ measures to Russia
some years ago.25 It should also be noted that the draft convention on the safety of spent
fuel and radioactive waste, presently under negotiation in Vienna, is likely to cover all
civilian spent fuel in all states parties, NWS and NNWS. It is also likely to include an
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explicit preambular option to submit, on a voluntary basis, spent fuel from military
production to the rules of the convention, and the convention will contain an inventory of
the material covered based on parties’ annual reports. This means that another part of the
„register material“ might be submitted to transparency by another instrument.26
However, it might be useful even at this stage for the reporting states to assess the likely
range of uncertainty for the figures they are providing. One would hope that for the first
item, warheads, this figure would be zero. For the fissile material reporting, this is unlikely
to be the case as all production facilities are bound to show some material unaccounted for
due to measurement uncertainty, production losses, and material retained in the plant (e.g.,
in curved pipes). De-facto nuclear weapon states would just fill in the „fissile material“ form
and leave the warhead account vacant. Since the fissile material total would include material
in warheads or other military use, it would reasonably enhance transparency without the
political risks that admitting the actual possession of nuclear weapons might entail.
6.2.2 Stage II
At the second stage, warheads might be broken down by type. Type would include the
military name of the warhead and the launcher for which this warhead was destined. At this
stage it would be useful to distinguish between deployed and reserve warheads. It would
also be useful to account for the platforms and launchers not contained in the UN Arms
Register (if not only transfers, but also holdings were ever included in the register, nuclear
bomber aircraft, nuclear-capable artillery, rockets and their launchers and nuclear weapons
carrying ships, surface and submerged, would show up in the annual declarations).
However, as long as the UN register does not necessarily contain information on weapon
types, this might be seen as too unspecific. In this case, it would be useful to enumerate
types and numbers of platforms/launchers as well. Again, a distinction between deployed
and non-deployed weapon systems would be advisable.
For fissile material, the following breakdown of the total might be possible: material in
civilian uses; material in military non-weapons uses, such as navy fuel; material in reserve;
material destined for disposal (that is scrap, material from dismantled weapons, other excess
material) and material in „other uses“ which would most likely cover fissile material in
warheads, in fabrication and refabrication. The label would once again avoid the awkward
question of de-facto-nuclear weapon states' real status, but would nevertheless enhance
transparency considerably. It would however, still prevent the precise assignment of a given
quantity of material to a given number of warheads, which could enable people to calculate
the precise composition of HEU and Pu per type of warhead, information that is generally
regarded as a military secret. It might be debatable whether such information would have
any military significance, as countries would hardly be in a position to refabricate an
identical warhead on the basis of such information, particularly in the absence of nuclear
tests; however, as long as not all these countries are parties to the CTBT, it might be argued
that this information could give away militarily significant data. On top of this, some might
object that releasing this information would not be compatible with Art. I of the NPT.
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A further refinement would be to differentiate both plutonium and highly enriched uranium
according to their specific isotopic composition (one proposal was to divide Pu into above
and below 10% Pu240 content, and uranium into higher than 85%, 65-85% 40-65%, 20-40%
and below 20% U235, and below and above 80% U233 content, respectively).27
Threshold countries could still participate in the registration of their fissile material. The
framing of the categories would be designed to permit this. A possible objection might be
that in revealing the total amount of „material in other uses“ rather than hiding it in the
larger total, threshold states might endanger their security because it might show how little
they (or one or two of them) have really got, and this might create vulnerabilities since the
deterrent value of their opacity would be drastically reduced. One would have to wait and
see which positions these countries take once that moment approaches.
It might be useful, at this stage, to include some information about the methodology used to
calculate the amounts of material, to assess the prospects of arriving at greater accuracy,
and to spell out steps taken in this direction. In addition, as reporting would be periodical -
that is, annual - it would be necessary to explain changes in the numbers of platforms and
launchers by specifying whether they had been exported or scrapped.
6.2.3 Stage III
Stage three contains some very daring suggestions that may never get off the ground;
nuclear weapon states may consider the information involved, or part of it, too sensitive to
be revealed short of total disarmament. Yet it is not inconceivable, the international context
permitting, that classification rules will be much more relaxed and readiness to admit much
larger transparency will be considerably enhanced, due to the experience of stages I and II
and to the repercussions of other disarmament steps taken in parallel.
Stage three information would contain all details from stage II, plus rough parameters for
the warheads (yield, size) that would make it possible to distinguish them visually. It might
even be possible to announce the precise amount of fissile material per warhead, though this
information might be given in a separate part of the register available only to the five
nuclear weapon states. In addition, the location where the warheads are stored and
deployed would be revealed.
Location would also be identified for all fissile material. This would require the dissolution
of the „other uses“ category for material in fabrication, refabrication and actual warheads.
The last veil of opacity protecting the de-facto nuclear weapon states’ status would thus
disappear. It goes without saying that this is only advisable and possible when a stage has
been reached at which nuclear disarmament is far advanced, and only if the three de-facto
nuclear weapon states are fully integrated into the process. In other words, stage three is
conceivable only as the jumping-off point for the very last phase before a zero-nuclear
weapon world will be achieved. Only at this point will the revelation about the de-facto
nuclear weapon states come at very low political cost, as the end of their status will be in
sight. Only then, too, will the nuclear weapon states consider giving away information that
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would, under other circumstances, certainly be seen as strictly classified for national security
reasons.
7. Verification
Whether this register needs verification, and from what stage on, is certainly a matter for
discussion. If we conceive of it as a voluntary transparency measure meant to facilitate
confidence building among the eight countries that have, or are supposed to have, nuclear
weapons, in other words drawn up on the model of the UN Weapons Register, then
verification is not warranted - at least not at the beginning. Politically, there is much to be
said for not insisting on a verification system initially. The matter concerns an area of the
highest sensitivity for all countries concerned. A verification system meant to make sure that
all warheads have been effectively declared and all weapons-usable fissile materials honestly
accounted for would almost certainly meet considerable resistance in all these countries.
The character of the register would change, because the most difficult and secretive type of
information would be required from the beginning: the precise location of all items to be
verified. It is inconceivable that Russia, the smaller nuclear weapon states - China in
particular - or the three de-facto nuclear weapon states would be willing to join a register
under these circumstances. To insist on a verification system would thus prevent the register
from ever coming into being.
In addition, negotiating a verification system would lead to enormous delays in an otherwise
quite straightforward process of establishing the register. Stage 1 follows a very simple
concept that presents few obstacles to agreeing quickly, and implementing expeditiously,
the scheme of declarations implied by it. Success or failure hinges completely on the
political will (or lack thereof) of the parties involved. It has little or nothing to do with the
intrinsic complexity of the subject. This picture would change completely if verification
requirements were added. Even if the highly improbable political will to seriously consider
verification were assured, these requirements would lead to long-drawn-out bargaining with
uncertain to unlikely chances of success and an even more uncertain start of the
implementation.
There are therefore very good reasons not to insist on register verification at the beginning
of the process. If - as is hoped - confidence is built through the process itself, and
supplemented through other nuclear arms control and disarmament measures (see below),
then a register even without verification is quite worthwhile considering. After all, it will be
difficult enough to muster the political will required even for this, very modest, purpose. We
should avoid all steps that would it more difficult for sympathetic decision makers in the
eight countries to persuade their peers to go along with the register idea.
At stage III, however, we can expect verification to have become intensive, largely because
of developments in other arms control and disarmament fields and because that stage, as
analyzed above, is hardly conceivable short of the firm determination of all participants to
lay down their nuclear arms. For this reason it can be expected that, if that stage is
reachable and realizable at all, it will be as well verified as a precondition to go from there
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to zero. Parties would certainly agree on far-reaching verification measures as a
precondition for abolishing the last remaining nuclear weapons.
8. The Register in Relation to Other Nuclear Disarmament Measures
Postponing the introduction of verification measures may be less problematic in view of the
precedent of the UN Conventional Arms Register, which was introduced without
verification of the data submitted by the participating countries and is still functioning
without such a system five years later. Another consideration which might help to persuade
the world community to establish a verification-free nuclear weapons and related materials
register without too many misgivings is the prospect that, as arms control and disarmament
measures multiply, much of what is included in the register may in any case be incrementally
subjected to verification..
8.1 The START Process
Let us assume that the START process continues. The most recent proposal submitted by
the United States foresees, for the first time, a binding commitment to dismantle the nuclear
warheads deployed on those launchers that are to be destroyed under START II. It is this
focus on first dismantling the warheads that permits the postponement of the initial target
date for launcher destruction (covering, in the first instance, all heavy, MIRVed
intercontinental ballistic missiles) without any increase in insecurity. Dismantling those
warheads removes the option of breaking out of the START II limits by reloading them
onto other missiles. In order to implement this commitment in an orderly manner, one
would assume that the parties to START II will agree upon verification measures to ensure
that the warheads to be dismantled are indeed warheads from and for the heavy missiles.
This paves the way for the verification measures we would recommend for a register.
In the understanding reached at the 1997 Helsinki summit between presidents Yeltsin and
Clinton, a framework outline was drafted for START III negotiations. The content of this
understanding made it obvious that START III might be a very crucial step for enhanced
transparency, at least between the two nuclear superpowers. Warheads are the basic unit for
further reductions, with all warheads, not only deployed ones, under review. Warhead
dismantlement will be included in the agreement to be negotiated.
If reductions cross the crucial 1000-warheads boundary, the „breakout problem“ of
reloading missiles that could carry more warheads than they actually do becomes more and
more strategically significant; likewise, the possibility of flying strategic bombers back from
their first strike missions, reloading them, and using them anew in a follow-on strike will
concern strategic planners. While this sounds like a scenario from Dr. Strangelove, we must
realize that this is and will remain a care problem of nuclear strategy until complete nuclear
disarmament is achieved. Strategists are used to thinking in these terms, and this thinking
style must be taken into account whether one likes it or not. In order to limit the
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uncertainties and insecurities emerging from these possibilities, nuclear weapon states
participating in global nuclear disarmament agreements will seek to limit not only deployed
warheads but also reserve warhead holdings. By the same token, the fissile material in
reserve that could be used to produce warheads for reserve and active forces would be
included. Again, verification measures would become necessary that would cover most of
what a register - even a stage II or III register - would require.
8.2 Separation of Launchers and Warheads
Among the proposals made in recent studies on nuclear disarmament that have attracted
considerable public attention, none is closer related to strategic stability than the one
recommending a separation of launchers and warheads in order to eliminate all fears of an
impending nuclear attack.28 While it might be possible to verify a related commitment just
ex negativo, that is by focusing on the launchers and to ensuring that no warheads are
mounted on them, verification might well go further. Particularly if certain distances were
prescribed for the separation system, the location of warheads would have to be known, and
some regular activity would be needed to ascertain that the warheads were actually in these
storage places and not closer to the launching sites than permitted. This, in turn, would
create information that is only foreseen for the daring third stage of the nuclear arms
register, as described above.
8.3 Limiting Tactical Nuclear Weapons
Additional impulses could emerge from ancillary arms limitation and disarmament measures.
For example, it has been repeatedly proposed to limit the holdings of tactical nuclear
warheads, and Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin envisaged such measures during their Helsinki
summit in 1997. This is a wise suggestion, as those weapons lend themselves to easier use
and often contain less advanced electronic locks to prevent unauthorized use and less
sophisticated safety technology to prevent accidental explosions. In addition, the range of
estimates for tactical nuclear weapon holdings in Russia and China vary enormously. Again,
any limitation agreement would imply measures to make sure that actual holdings are not
larger than permitted, and that dismantling would ensue as foreseen - a task very closely
related to the reporting required under a register in all three phases.
8.4 A Fissile Material Cut-Off and Other Measures to Control Fissile
Materials
With regard to fissile materials, it should be noted that a cut-off treaty would definitely
bring some material presently out of safeguards under the purview of the International
                                         
28 See the related proposal in: Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons. Report of
the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, August 1996.
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Atomic Energy Agency. This relates to all fissile material used for peaceful purposes and
declared excess by the nuclear weapon states. The same applies to the guidelines for the
handling of plutonium that have been negotiated between the users of plutonium, including
the five nuclear weapon states, over the last few years in Vienna.
8.5 The Register as a Stepping Stone to a Zero Nuclear Weapons World
In the last stage of nuclear disarmament, the register as conceived in stage III and the
disarmament process are likely to converge. The risk of cheating and breakout would loom
large at this stage, and participants as well as the world community would wish this risk to
be excluded with as much certainty as possible. This would require reliable inventories of
both nuclear warheads and fissile material and an intrusive and dense verification system to
make sure that these inventories were complete and correct. The difficulties of achieving
this should not be underestimated, particularly in the light of the present range of estimates
for the holdings of the nuclear weapon states.
9.  The Forum for Negotiating a Nuclear Arms Register
Where could or should a register be negotiated? Several possibilities offer themselves: the
expert group tasked with improving the UN Conventional Arms Register could suggest
amendments to the initial resolution to include nuclear weapons and fissile materials; the
UNGA could agree on a new resolution, creating a separate register; the CD could install a
nuclear disarmament ad-hoc committee with the explicit mandate to discuss such a register;
the enhanced NPT review process could be used for this purpose; it could be left to the P-5
plus the three de-facto-nuclear weapon states; or the P-5 could start the negotiation and
invite others to join as appropriate.
9.1 Using the Conventional Arms Trade Register Process
The suggestion has been made to amend the Conventional Arms Trade Register in such a
way as to make it applicable to weapons of mass destruction as well. There would be
advantages to using an already available instrument with an established administration
procedure. In the long run, such a register would develop into a world inventory of arms. In
addition, concessions by the nuclear weapon states might induce other countries to be more
forthcoming with respect to the inclusion of data they regard as intimately related to their
own national security (e.g., weapons production and holdings).
However, the UN Conventional Arms Register may not be the best place to start. First, the
qualitative distinction between conventional arms and weapons of mass destruction,
particularly nuclear weapons, should not be blurred. This speaks for a separate rather than
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an integrated solution. Secondly, it might be preferable to keep register undertakings equal
for all participants. Since only a few countries are supposed to report under the nuclear
weapons register, such equality could not be maintained. Thirdly and more importantly, the
Conventional Arms Trade Register is concerned with exports and imports and may remain
so for an extended period. In contrast, the export of nuclear weapons is categorically
prohibited under the NPT, to which all nuclear weapon states belong. The export of fissile
materials that could be used for weapons purposes to non-nuclear weapon states (as defined
by the NPT, that is, including the three de-facto nuclear weapon states) is already registered
through the IAEA, as this falls under the safeguards obligation of Art. III of the NPT and
the related Safeguards Agreement INFCIRC/153. Fourth, while the UN Conventional Arms
Register is based on voluntary participation, it is likely that participants would wish to have
some guarantee for the participation of at least the other nuclear weapon states, if not the
de-facto nuclear weapon states as well, in the form of a legally binding undertaking. Finally,
it is not clear whether the group of experts - experts mainly on conventional weapons - is an
ideal body to prepare the details of a nuclear arms register.
For much the same reasons, while the UNGA should certainly endorse a register agreement
if and when it comes along in form of a draft resolution, it appears not to be the ideal body
to negotiate the details; nor is its first committee in a good position to do so. Either body
should consider and discuss whatever concept emerges from other negotiation fora, but if
these do not come up with a useful and well-worked out proposal, the UNGA would not be
capable of stepping into the breach..
9.2 The Conference on Disarmament
Using the CD for the purpose looks a better option. CD parties are quarrelling about the
installation of an ad-hoc committee on nuclear disarmament. While the non-aligned
countries, supported by some northern non-nuclear weapon states, wish to see tangible
steps towards nuclear disarmament, nuclear weapon states are concerned about a „slippery
slope“ do not want to see a multilateral body that might be insensitive to their security
interests intervening in an issue they regard as vital to these interest.
The solution might be to install a nuclear disarmament committee with a specific mandate
not to negotiate nuclear disarmament per se, but to develop the proposal for a nuclear arms
register. The rationale is the intimate relationship and instrumentality of such a register to
the disarmament process, as elaborated at length above. The CD certainly contains the
expertise in matters nuclear to discuss the matter in a meaningful way. Such an approach
would also prevent the CD, the only multilateral disarmament body, being innobilized if
there is continued stalemate on both the fissile material cut-off and the ban on anti-
personnel landmines.
If it proves unworkable to include the item under the heading of nuclear disarmament
because of objections from any quarter it could be usefully dealt with under the heading of
„transparency in armaments“, which is also on the CD agenda. This item has been largely
idle for most of the lifetime of the CD, partly because of the reluctance of the non-aligned
countries to grant more insight into matters they view as pertaining closely to their own
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security unless there is movement on the nuclear disarmament side. Taking up the nuclear
arms register in this context might thus be viewed as an adequate quid pro quo.
A third option would be not to negotiate the register in the CD at all, but to establish an ad-
hoc committee on nuclear disarmament without a negotiation mandate to which the
countries participating in the register would report on their negotiation process, present the
results, and submit the register data annually once it is established. These data could present
a solid information base on which the deliberations by the committee on nuclear
disarmament could build.
9.3 Negotiations Among the P-5 or the P-5 plus 3
It could be claimed that the expertise necessary to work out the details of a register lies
exclusively in the hands of those countries that possess nuclear weapons, because only they
know about both the possibilities and risks of revealing specific information about the
arsenals and the materials of which they are made. Likewise, the argument could be made
that they would feel fewer inhibitions about discussing this matter frankly amongst
themselves, not least because Art. I of the NPT would not apply (this, however, would not
be valid for a forum in which the three de-facto nuclear weapon states participated as they
are non-nuclear weapon states under the definition of the NPT). Because of these
advantages, a small forum consisting only of the „haves“ might be able to solve the issues
connected to establishing a register more quickly than a multilateral forum with wider
membership.
While it should not be denied that this is a possibility, there are nevertheless reasons why a
multilateral forum with strong participation by non-nuclear weapon states is preferable.
First, a register is meant, inter alia, to work as an instrument ensuring accountability of the
nuclear weapon states to the world community. Consequently, it would be appropriate to
have this community present when the details of the register are decided. Secondly, a
certain pressure on the nuclear weapon states might help to give the register a more open
and informative shape than if the nuclear weapon states, which have a shared interest in
keeping accountability limited, were to decide everything among themselves. Third, the
value of the register as an instrument of security and its role in the disarmament process
might be better understood by a broader range of actors if these actors had a say in bringing
it about. Fourth, a multilateral forum - notably the CD - would automatically ensure the
presence of the three de-facto nuclear weapon states. And, finally, for four three reasons the
cohesion of the nonproliferation regime might also be improved.
Within a multilateral negotiating body, the P-5 or the P5 plus three have ample opportunity
to clear issues, as appropriate, among themselves in a limited caucus. The P-5 did this
extensively - some would say too extensively - during the test ban negotiations. However, in
contrast to this precedence, great care should be taken to include the three de-facto nuclear
weapon states in this caucus to prevent them feeling alienated from the substance of the
talks and refusing to accept the final result. The experience with the test ban is a serious
warning in this regard.
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However, the CD operates under the unanimity rule. For this reason, the attempt to extract
a negotiation mandate from this body might fail. Certain non-nuclear weapon states might
be dissatisfied with a more limited definition of the subject of negotiations and could object.
One or a few of the nuclear weapon states or the de-facto nuclear weapon states may not be
willing to let negotiations start. In either case, it might be better to restrict the talks to a
smaller circle. If the political will existed, this could be done through a parallel to the
Ottawa process, that is, within a group of like-minded countries. It goes without saying that
this would have little meaning unless a majority of the eight most important countries
participated. If, outside of a formal multilateral body, they preferred to discuss matters
among themselves, such a process would be preferable to no register at all if it yielded
meaningful results. Similarly, a system initiated by the P-5 without a role for the three de-
facto nuclear weapon states would be preferable to the lack of transparency presently
obtaining, particularly if it were set up in such a way as to admit and facilitate later
accession by the three. Again, something would be better than nothing, but we recognize
that countries in regions adjacent to the de-facto nuclear weapon states may have different
priorities.
9.4 Using the Enhanced NPT Review Process
It has been suggested that the enhanced Review Process that was agreed to in the context of
the indefinite extension of the NPT, and which has started in April 1997 with the first
session of its preparatory commission, should be more extensively used as an negotiating
body for nuclear disarmament issues. This suggestion has gained some strength through the
present stalemate in Geneva. However, there are principled reasons why this suggestion
should be treated with considerable caution and why, in our particular context, its
implementation might quickly prove counterproductive.
First, the review process is no negotiation process. It would be artificial to transform it from
its primary task of scrutinizing the implementation of a specific treaty and proposing steps
to enhance this implementation into a forum where other international instruments would be
worked out. Secondly, such a practice would devalue the CD as the authoritative
multilateral negotiation body - without a tangible advantage, as the rules of the Review
Conferences would presumably also contain the consensus clause. While past rules of
procedure permitted voting in extreme circumstances and as the consequence of an
elaborate sequence of procedural steps, this rule has never been used. Since negotiating
would be an innovative mission for the Review, it is likely that new, specific rules would be
set up for this purpose, and there is no prospect that the nuclear weapon states would
accept any negotiation on a nuclear weapons issue that would not allow them a veto.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the three de-facto nuclear weapon states are not
parties to the NPT and its review process. They would be excluded from the beginning, and
the prospects of their ever acceding to an instrument in the negotiations of which they
would not have had a say are extremely slim.
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9.5 Applying Stop-Gap, Partial Measures
If none of the above options looks promising for political reasons, existing processes could
be used to achieve the purposes of the register at least partially. Naturally, other nuclear-
related arms control talks, as discussed above, would be natural venues for pursuing this
objective. The following roads could be taken:
· The talks on international plutonium management among eight countries, including the
nuclear weapon states, could be extended to highly enriched uranium. Language
requiring the submission of material from disarmed warheads could be strengthened. In
this way a considerable and increasing proportion of weapons-grade material in the
nuclear weapon states would be covered by international verification and transparency
measures.
· Bilateral US-Russian negotiations in the context of the Gore-Chernomyrdin rounds
resulted, in fall 1995, in a mutual transparency regime that came as close to stage II
measures - as discussed above - as could be desired. If multilateral efforts fail, this forum
could provide a fall-back position to install at least some bilateral transparency.
· Bilateral transparency could also be pursued in the context of START III negotiations, as
envisaged in the Clinton-Yeltsin agreement at Helsinki. Since the other three nuclear
weapon states can be expected to be included, in some way, in START IV at the latest,
such transparency measures could and would be extended to them through the START
process.
· The fissile material cut-off, if the process ever gets started, would offer another
opportunity to achieve enhanced transparency, at least as far as fissile material that will
be produced in the future is concerned. However, a cut-off may also contain some
summary reporting on past stocks, or at least establish a parallel track where such
information could be discussed.
· Those nuclear weapon states willing to do so could offer some voluntary reporting in the
CD, First Committee, or Enhanced Review Process context, pending the negotiation of a
more formally based register.
None of these stop-gap measures can be expected to yield the full amount of information
that was proposed here for the register. They would all represent bits and pieces of the
overall picture.
As a result of these considerations, using the CD for straightforward negotiations to
establish a nuclear weapons register would certainly be the preferable option. An Ottawa-
type process or the Conventional Arms Register review process could be used as
substitutes, though it is hard to see how the latter could succeed where the CD had failed.
An agreement between the P-5 plus three or at least the P-5 that was submitted to the
UNGA would be better than nothing. Stop-gap measures would produce a puzzle from
which informed observers could draw conclusions close to what a register would reveal, but
it would lack the symbolic force and practical manageability of a consolidated register.
However, if nothing else were available, this would be better than nothing.
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10. Institutionalization
A register must be drawn up, maintained, collected, kept, and circulated, and someone has
to take responsibility for performing these tasks. There are various options that mirror those
just discussed for the negotiation stage.
· The IAEA could be tasked with administering the register. This appears to make sense as
fissile material falls into its purview anyway, and the Agency will probably be called upon
to look into initial inventories and production history in the context of complete nuclear
disarmament. To be involved in this process early on would increase the chances that the
IAEA is well prepared for the day when this daunting task is laid upon its shoulders.
· However, there may be objections that its statute confines the Agency to the peaceful
uses of atomic energy and that weapons fall outside of its purview. Nevertheless, the
mission given to the IAEA in the context of UNSC resolution 687, the dismantling of
Iraq’s nuclear weapons programme and ensuring that it is not restarted, the Agency
became involved in the military nuclear sector. It mastered this new field by calling upon
the nuclear weapon states to second expert staff; in this way, sufficient expertise was
assembled and the risk that nonproliferation goals could be compromised - by inspectors
from non-nuclear weapon states looking into weapons factories - could be avoided.
There is no reason why this procedure could not be applied in a register context. Initially,
a register would pose even fewer dangers as long as no verification measures were
attached to it.
· One could also consider giving the task to the new Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
Organization, as this body is already closely connected to nuclear disarmament issues.
Given the fact that the CTBTO is connected to a specific disarmament treaty, however, it
is unlikely that such an enlargement of its mission could be effected without the assent of
all parties, and it is unclear whether this could be done as long as the CTBT has not
entered into force. It is also likely to be a long time before this happens. For practical
reasons, therefore, this option does not appear realistic.
· If the NWR is attached to the UN Conventional Arms Register it would fall on the UN
Secretariat to administer it in the context of its UNCAR activities, of which it would be
just a part. However, as attaching the nuclear to the conventional register is not a very
good idea, it is not likely that this will be the option chosen.
· The alternative would be to use just the same type of mechanism as for the Conventional
Arms Register, but to deal with the NWR separately. In this way the UN Secretariat
would be charged with this task under a different heading.
· If the register were an exclusive P-5 initiative a standing commission would probably be
established. This body would meet annually and would be staffed by experts and high-
ranking officials from the foreign and defense ministries and atomic energy agencies or
ministries of the five nuclear weapon states. The register would be maintained by this
commission. The five could use the CD - its nuclear disarmament or transparency
groups, the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, or the Information Circulars
of the IAEA - to communicate register data.
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· Finally, the register could be attached to a cut-off treaty by the five - or the eight - on a
voluntary or contractual basis. Since it is possible or likely that the IAEA will be
involved in, or exclusively tasked with, verifying a fissile material cut-off, the Agency
would again have to take responsibility for administering the register.
11. Conclusion
A nuclear weapons register is an idea whose time has come. It would enhance international
security, corroborate the principles of transparency and of accountability of the nuclear
weapon states vis-à-vis the world community, and would be a stepping stone towards, and
eventually an indispensable precondition for nuclear disarmament, as it would serve as a
precursor for verification in a nuclear weapon free world. By the same token, if
conceptualized appropriately and with due respect for the present concerns and sensitivities
of those countries possessing nuclear weapons or unsafeguarded fissile material, such a
register could be introduced without any loss of security for these countries, and it could
evolve as confidence is built, relaxing these concerns and sensitivities beyond the limits
presently obtaining.
For reasons of acceptability for the countries concerned and the integrity of the legal
construction of the nuclear nonproliferation regime, it would be wise to limit the
undertakings of the three de-facto nuclear weapon states to reporting their fissile material
holdings out of safeguards. Some differentiation in these reports would be possible if the
reporting form were shaped appropriately - i.e., the „other uses“ category - so that these
states would not be required to specify precisely their (supposed) nuclear weapon holdings.
The register should start without a verification obligation in order to respect the sensitivities
of the eight countries concerned. Verification measures could be added, by agreement, as
the register evolves. It can also be expected that aspects covered by the register would
come under bilateral, multilateral or international verification as a consequence of other
nuclear arms control and disarmament measures. Verification will become indispensable in
the last stages of nuclear disarmament.
For reasons of practicability, the register should be established as a separate body. The CD
route appears most appropriate. Other forums have disadvantages. Limiting the forum to
the eight or five countries immediately concerned may facilitate its creation in some
respects, but would not be optimal in terms of confidence and accountability and would thus
endanger some of the improvements that could otherwise be expected in relations between
nuclear and non-nuclear weapon states.
As in all policy areas related to nuclear disarmament, here again the best is certainly the
enemy of the good. An ideal register would be a stage III one, bolstered by verification and
complete information about all eight countries. This is much too much to ask for in the
present situation. There is therefore much to be said for considering the much more
moderate, but still very useful, system developed under the stage I label. As mentioned at
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the outset, in nuclear disarmament incrementalism is the name of the game; this principle
applies to the nuclear arms register as well.
Enhanced transparency in nuclear armaments has become a real possibility after the end of
the cold war. It is part and parcel of a once „utopian“ order of international security in
which states, the major powers in particular, seek their security by means of cooperation
rather than by power competition, and where arms control, transparency and disarmament
are becoming guiding principles of both international security and national security policies
in preference unfettered unilateral arms build-up, secrecy and deception.
A nuclear weapons register is compatible with, and could be called a foundation of, three
distinct types of nuclear world order, all of which would be preferable to an unfettered
anarchic competition among the major powers. The first is a P-5 (or P-6, if we include
India) concert: relations between the nuclear weapon states are carefully managed so as to
avoid major conflict and crisis that could lead to a danger of nuclear war. Conflicts between
(and, possibly, within) minor powers are approached through intense consultation and
solved by joint diplomatic efforts and commonly conducted, or at least commonly
mandated, intervention, depending on the situation on the ground. The register, in this
model, would serve as a basis of mutual confidence that no state was striving towards a
nuclear superiority that would make it possible to shift the order from concert to monopoly.
To provide this useful capacity, the register could be confined to the five (six) themselves,
with no or little enhanced transparency towards the rest of the world.
The second model would be one of „trusteeship“. The five (six) would largely perform the
same tasks, but other major non-nuclear powers, such as Japan, Germany, Brazil, Indonesia,
South Africa, Egypt etc. would be involved in order-keeping as well. „Concerting“ would
be explicitly performed as (or as if) mandated by the international community. As a
corollary, states involved in these activities would bear responsibility and accountability
towards the rest of the world; for the nuclear weapon states, this would clearly mean giving
some regular information about the size and state of their atomic arsenals. Whether a stage
1 type register would suffice for this purpose or whether the more exacting standards of
stage 2 would be required would emerge as a result of the negotiations establishing the
„trusteeship regime“. One should note that such an order, coming about not by imposition
and grudging acceptance but by negotiation and consensus, would require a considerable
shift of opinion by the majority of the non-nuclear weapon states, as it would accord nuclear
weapon possession much more and longer-term legitimacy than even the NPT implies.
The third model is, of course, nuclear disarmament. As pointed out above, the last steps
towards „zero“ will never be taken without considerable confidence at the part of the
disarming states that weapons and materials were carefully registered and reliably accounted
for. Since nuclear disarmament is a world order change, not just a change in relative
capabilities within a limited group of states, the transparency measures preparing and
accompanying nuclear disarmament would necessarily become more globally accountable as
the final stage drew closer: there might be more transparency without complete
disarmament, but there will certainly not be disarmament without complete transparency.
Thus transparency measures in the nuclear field have the potential to affect relations among
the nuclear weapon states and between them and the non-nuclear armed majority. The intra-
NWS effects of enhanced transparency merit particular attention. The present lull in great
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power conflict and the unchallenged superiority of the United States lead too many people
to the conclusion that the big nuclear risks are over. This is not necessarily the case. If
things go wrong, deadly quarrels could emerge between some nuclear armed pairs (India-
China, Russia-China) or between one or more of these three and „the West“, led by the
United States. In an era in which some analysts argue that the „Revolution in Military
Affairs“ tends to give the advantage to the offensive, and that there would be a premium on
preemption if a number of countries mastered this "Revolution" simultaneously,29 the
reemergence of nuclear arms racing would be a dangerous development. Pacifying the
nuclear field is thus part of an overall strategy to prevent such conflicts from emerging.
Presently great power relations are relatively benign, and there is the lucky coincidence that
the leading world power is also the state most inclined to enhance transparency. This
opportunity should not be wasted.
                                         
29 John Orme, The Utility of Force in a World of Scarcity, in: International Security, Vol. 22, No. 3,
Winter 1997/98, pp. 138-167.
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List of Abbreviations:
CD Conference on Disarmament
CTBT Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
CTBTO Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization
EURATOM European Atomic Energy Community
HEU Highly Enriched Uranium
IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency
INFCIRC Information Circular (of the IAEA)
NNWSNon-Nuclear Weapon State
NPT Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty
NWS Nuclear Weapon State
MOX Mixed Oxide Fuel
OSCE Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
Pu Plutonium
START Strategic Arms Reduction Talks
STI Safeguards, Transparency and Irreversibility
UNGA United Nations General Assembly
UNSC United Nations Security Council
TIA Transparency in Arms
